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Beyond Spheres of Influence: the myth of the state and Russia’s seductive power 
in Kyrgyzstan 





When Russian plans for a Eurasian economic community were first announced in 
2012, Secretary of State Hilary Clinton lashed out at the Kremlin’s ‘attempts to re-
Sovietize’ the former Soviet space; as she ominously put it, ‘We know what the goal 
is and we are trying to figure out ways to slow down or prevent it’.1 Ever since, the 
idea that Russia’s Great Power identity is necessarily associated with seeking a sphere 
of influence in the ‘Near Abroad’ has been gaining currency.2 This association is 
nevertheless debatable. The question is not simply whether Russia has a sphere-of-
influence policy in the former Soviet Union (FSU), or whether such a policy can 
succeed. The core meaning of the concept of ‘sphere of influence’ contains specific 
and very familiar assumptions about state, space and power, not least in its 
essentialization of bounded, exclusionary space and a narrow reading of power.3 
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These assumptions are problematic as a lens with which to understand Russia’s 
enduring influence the post-Soviet space.  
As Susanna Hast has rightly highlighted, some of this is a normative issue, reflecting 
the way that the concept and associated norms have become delegitimized during de-
colonization and the ideological sphere-of-influence policies of the Cold War.4 
However, this article has a different focus, casting a critical light on the return of 
‘Spheres of Influence’ as an analytical concept. As I will argue, ontologies of state, 
space and power inherent in the meaning of the concept cannot grasp the complex 
historical legacies and ongoing processes of post-Soviet state reconstruction. They 
‘flatten’ the multiple, ambivalent logics of state and space that result from these 
processes and impose a linear, causal understanding of power as control. In other 
words, the static ontologies conveyed by the concept do not help us to understand 
state power operating across space, or! the reproduction of ‘the state’ in these 
operations. As a result, the ‘return of Spheres of Influence’ narrative produces an 
impoverished and somewhat misleading account of Russian influence in the post-
Soviet space.  
The concept ‘sphere of influence’ is strongly associated with what John Agnew has 
called the modern geopolitical imagination.5  At its core is the ‘Westphalian myth’, an 
understanding of state space as fixed and bounded that is associated with classical 
geopolitics and Realist approaches in International Relations.6 An extensive literature 
both in IR and in critical geopolitics has deconstructed the spatial assumptions 
inherent in this depiction of the state, not least in response to the global spread of a 
(neo)liberal disposition that seemed to erase Westphalian statehood after the end of 
the Cold War.7 Nevertheless, the Westphalian myth of the state remains a suggestive 
image, and has most recently made a comeback in narratives of ‘rising Great Powers’ 
and a ‘return of geopolitics’ – the latter explicitly or implicitly referencing the 
assumptions of classical geopolitics, especially the British geographer Halford 
Mackinder.8 One example of this are binary accounts of Russia jostling with the US 
and latterly China for influence in Kyrgyzstan, a country that used to be depicted as a 
Western-leaning ‘island of democracy’ in Central Asia, but now is more often 
described as a Russian ‘client state’.9  These kinds of accounts do not capture the 
persistence and limitations of Russian influence in the region or the particular context 
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in which it is perpetuated. Post-Soviet states, including Russia, have been produced in 
a complex interplay of state disintegration and reconfiguration, reflecting the 
ambiguous legacies of Soviet statehood as well as the (neo-)liberal global juncture of 
the 1990s and 2000s. All these factors combine in producing a variety of spatial logics 
underpinning performances of ‘the state’.  
This emphasis on performance implies an analytical move towards thinking about the 
state as produced in symbols and practices, including discursive practices. In Timothy 
Mitchell’s influential formulation, this is the state not as the source, but an effect of 
power, a ‘state effect’ produced in ever evolving performances.10 In this, power 
relations matter. However, they are not the linear reading of power as exclusive 
control over territory associated with spheres of influence. Instead, this is power at a 
distance, ‘seductive power’ that works to produce particular political subjectivities 
and is effective precisely because it draws on mutually constitutive understandings of 
state and space.11 This article draws on understandings of the state as effect, myth and 
performance to critically interrogate the assumptions that drive the return of ‘Spheres 
of Influence’ as an analytical concept. It does so by showing how a particular post-
Soviet kind of state-ness, and with this, Russian seductive power, is produced in 
discourse and practices between Russia and Kyrgyzstan. This ‘state effect’ is 
characterized by an ambivalent interplay of open and bounded representations of 
political space and a de-territorialized, embodied meaning of sovereignty. I draw on a 
series of interviews, conducted with Kyrgyz experts, businesspeople, MPs and social 
activists in Bishkek in 2013 and 2016, as well as media sources and recent secondary 
literature, to explore these logics of space and power in the relationship between 
Russia and Kyrgyzstan.12 The article first discusses the assumptions about space, state 
and power inherent in the concept of Sphere of Influence. It then shows how shared 
conceptions of state and space, as well as material factors such as enduring networks 
at both elite and societal level, (re)produce Russian power in Kyrgyzstan in a way that 
is fundamentally at odds with the ontological and epistemological assumptions 
evoked by ‘spheres of influence’. Thinking through the state as myth and performance 
allows us a richer understanding of the variable geographies of power that come into 
play in the relations between Russia and Kyrgyzstan. It also captures how political 
power is legitimized though the myth of the state in the region. This is true for the 
relational production of sovereignty in Kyrgyzstan, but also affects the Russian myth 
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of the state as Great Power. The concept ‘Spheres of Influence’ cannot grasp these 
complexities and thus obscures more than it reveals about Russian power in the post-
Soviet space.  !
Spheres of influence and Great Games in the ‘heartland’ 
As Susanna Hast has pointed out, ‘when we go looking for a theoretical 
conceptualization of what a sphere of influence is, we will find a debate on the role of 
the state’.13 This is not just because the concept is explicitly linked to the statecraft of 
imperial powers in the latter half of the 19th century. Modern, Westphalian 
representations of statehood revolve around the ‘territorial trap’, thinking the state as 
an autonomous agent constituted by an inexorable link between sovereign power and 
exclusive control over bounded territory.14 These assumptions are also reproduced in 
dominant understandings of ‘Sphere of Influence’. Unlike hegemony or soft power, 
concepts that also seek to express the idea of an external influence by means other 
than the use of force, the concept ‘sphere of influence’ is explicitly spatial in nature, 
and the spatial imagination that underpins it is unambiguously Westphalian in its 
depiction of power over space as exclusionary control, exercised by autonomous 
state-agents.  
As a concept of diplomatic practice, ‘sphere of influence’ reflected the dominance of 
the imperial Great Powers and their global competition for space, not least in the early 
20th century ‘Great Game’ between the British and Russian empires in Central Asia. 15 
One of the specific meanings of the concept at the time was its delineation in direct 
negotiation between imperial powers, without any agency for the influenced states 
and territories.16 This was connected to a conception of space that foregrounded 
boundedness and exclusion, as in aspirations to the exclusive influence of one Great 
Power over a clearly delineated territory. Thus, in the 1907 Anglo-Russian convention 
formalizing Russian and British spheres of influence in Central Asia, Afghanistan was 
described as a sovereign state “outside the sphere of Russian influence,” and 
committed to conduct all its external relations “through the intermediary of His 
Britannic Majesty’s Government”.17  
The Great Game reflected the rise of geopolitical narratives as deterministic 
explanations of world politics.18 A few years before the Anglo-Russian convention, 
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Halford Mackinder formulated a direct connection between spheres of influence in 
Central Asia and a global balance of power. He designated Central Eurasia (broadly 
speaking present day Central Asia as well as Russia east of the Ural mountains) as the 
‘heartland’, the ‘geographical pivot of history’ whose control promised world 
domination.19 This kind of geopolitical determinism describes world politics as zero-
sum competition for control over territory, whether directly (empire or military 
occupation) or indirectly (spheres of influence). It also contains an ontology of Great 
Powers as quintessentially Westphalian sovereign subjects: unitary, strategic actors 
defined by an ability to project power in space, be it by military means or ‘statecraft’. 
20 This focus on direct agreements between Great Powers, competition for exclusive 
space, a causal view of power as control achieved through the deployment of tools of 
statecraft, and the writing out of the agency of smaller states has remained at the core 
of the concept, even as it became de-legitimized as an international norm after the 
first World War.21 In fact, its disappearance from the acceptable vocabulary of 
international relations did not mean the end of spheres of influence. On the contrary, 
the de-legitimation and increasing politicization of the term went hand in hand with 
the continued practice of sphere-of-influence policies by the superpowers during the 
Cold War. The fixation and division of space represented by the concept was 
deepened by the addition of a new element – ideological enmity and thus the fixation 
of difference at a much deeper, totalizing, level.22 De facto Soviet and American 
spheres of influence were asserted by the transformation of the totality of society into 
communist or capitalist systems. This was bounded space as container, not of a 
‘domestic’ of no concern to understanding the international, but of clearly articulated 
and irreconcilable difference.  
After the Cold War, the language of geographical determinism remains an enduring 
trope in commentary on Russia.23 Long before Russia’s 2008 use of force in Georgia 
and the current standoff with the West over Russian meddling in Ukraine, a return to 
classical geopolitical imagery underpinned the re-emergence of the ‘Great Game’ 
metaphor and the popularity of Mackinder’s vision of the ‘Heartland’ in analyses of 
post-Soviet Central Asia, both within and outside the region.24 A typical example is 
the way that the US airbase in Manas, close to Kyrgyzstan’s capital Bishkek (and to 
Russia’s military base in Kant), has been presented as the focus of a ‘Great Game’ 
between Russia and the US over dominance in Kyrgyzstan, with accounts of Russia’s 
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power shifting quite radically in a matter of months, depending on the perceived state 
of the ‘game’.25 Thus, the Kremlin was said to be losing influence when Russian 
pressure failed to close the Manas airbase in 2009; nine months later, Russian 
influence in Kyrgyz politics was deemed so strong that it was able to orchestrate a 
popular uprising that overthrew the government of Kurmanbek Bakiev that had 
denied its request. The final closure of the airbase in 2014 and Kyrgyzstan’s accession 
to the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) in 2015 have been read as proof 
that Kyrgyzstan has moved into a Russian sphere of influence – though a new 
iteration of the game is said to be already in the making, with Russia’s influence 
under threat from China’s economic dominance in a struggle between the EEU and 
the Chinese One Road One Belt project.26 
This reflects some of the problems with ‘spheres of influence’ and the ‘new Great 
Game’ as an analytical lens. The latter concept has been extensively critically 
dissected elsewhere and need not be re-examined here. Alex Cooley and others have 
highlighted the considerable agency of local elites and their ability to negotiate with 
and even manipulate the Great Powers, as well as critiquing the assumption of a 
strategy of exclusive dominance in Central Asia by Russia and other outside players.27 
These critiques raise important points, but they ultimately do not break with the 
geopolitical imagination underlying the narrative of a ‘return of spheres of influence’. 
They remain wedded to ontological and epistemological assumptions about the nature 
of the state and power that determine the questions they ask: about the intentions of 
actors, or the success or failure of policy strategies. This closes down pathways for 
understanding the dynamics of state, space and power in the relationship between 
Russia and the states of post-Soviet Central Asia. These relations are taking place in a 
particular historical context, locally and globally, that highlights the point made by 
Agnew about the static ontology of the ‘territorial trap’: it produces an image of the 
state that has never been more than a historically contingent idea.28 The influx of 
classical geopolitical tropes, and in particular the return of ‘spheres of influence’ as an 
analytical lens, obscure the multiple ways in which imperial and Soviet legacies - and 
the ambivalences of state and space that result from them - produce power, space and 
the state in the region. 
State and space in the post-Soviet myth of the state 
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Reading the state with Timothy Mitchell as  ‘the powerful, apparently metaphysical 
effect of practices’ (including discursive practices) refocuses analysis away from 
transhistorical ‘geopolitical truths’ towards the historical and cultural contingency of 
the way the state is performed.29 It also means that we should not assume ‘the state’ as 
a coherent, autonomous, easily legible entity. In fact, it is precisely the absence of 
these attributes that can be captured by thinking about the state as effect – the 
ambivalences and tensions created as ‘the state’ is produced in different relations at 
different sites, in actions by state officials as well as in the experiences of its 
inhabitants.30 If there was any doubt that Mitchell’s ‘state effect’ is more than just a 
theoretical move, the experience of state collapse and state reconstruction in the 
former Soviet space – including Russia – provides ample evidence to the contrary. 
Discourses of ‘strong stateness’ are pervasive both in Russia and in Central Asia.31 As 
John Heathershaw put it, this is a ‘statist imaginary where the centre of power is both 
dispassionately distant and fantastically almighty’, imagined as provider of stability 
and pastoral care for its population.32 At the same time, political power in the region 
is characterized by the dominance of informal practices in networks of ‘statespeople’, 
with the blurring of boundaries between public and private and the hijacking of state 
structures as source of private revenue a frequent result.33 These ambiguities are 
exceptionally visible in Kyrgyzstan, where, as Madeleine Reeves put it, ‘the very 
location of state authority is up for grabs’ and where informal clientelistic relations 
often take the place of institutional structures. 34  The resulting widespread 
ineffectiveness and arbitrariness of state organs, and the repeated inaction of the state 
in situations of outright fragmentation of political space and violent conflict, mean 
that discourses of strong state-ness are often ill-matched to the way the state is 
experienced by its inhabitants.35  
The tension between these experiences of the state and images of state strength 
circulating in the region has been described as a ‘paradox’.36 However, the persistence 
of discourses of the strong, autonomous state also highlights how ‘the state’ operates 
as a myth that is enacted by post-Soviet state elites to legitimize their claims to power, 
in sometimes spectacular performances.37 Thomas Hansen and Finn Stepputat have 
called this the ‘mythical dimension’ of the modern state, the state as a ‘social fantasy’ 
legitimizing the power of those claiming to speak in its name. As they emphasize, 
languages of stateness are ‘localized meanings, genealogies and trajectories’ 
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expressive of a particular context rather than simple variants of a universal form.38  
This mythical dimension of the modern state also has a diachronic dimension, 
projecting past meanings, shaped in past experiences, into the present.39 This is 
particularly visible when it comes to understandings of sovereignty, claims to 
legitimate political authority associated with the state. Sovereignty is one of the oldest 
concepts in the political vocabulary, resonant with meanings of embodied sovereign 
subjectivity that predate its Westphalian focus on territorial boundedness. In the 
Russian myth of the state, the embodiment of the sovereign subject in an actual 
person, the tsar, remained explicitly part of understandings of ‘samoderzhavie’ 
(autocracy) until the end of the Russian empire in 1917.40 Soviet conceptions of 
sovereignty included a strong understanding of sovereign territoriality in the way that 
its border and in particular the boundary with the West established absolute difference 
and was almost impenetrable for ordinary citizens. A territorial conception also 
underpinned the sovereignty of the individual republics of the Soviet Union (which 
became the successor states after 1991). The Kyrgyz SSR, as well as all the other 
Soviet republics with the exception of Russia, was granted sovereignty on the basis of 
the principle of ethno-territoriality – homelands of a primordially defined nation.41 
However, within the USSR, understandings of sovereignty were more ambivalent, 
effectively departing from the Westphalian idea of sovereignty as exclusive control 
over territory. Thus, Soviet legal discourse formulated a sovereignty ‘surplus’ in 
relations between the Union republics and the Soviet centre, effectively a ‘doubling-
up’ of sovereignty claims on the same territory.42 This was a reflection of even more 
pronounced ambivalences of sovereign power in political practice, introduced by the 
dissociation of political authority from the structures of the territorial state and its 
location in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. 43 
In the post-Soviet myth of the state circulating between Russia and Kyrgyzstan, 
conceptions of sovereignty take a prominent place, as do representations of space.  
But as will be seen in the next section, these understandings cannot be reduced to the 
meaning of bounded territorial sovereignty that appears to be the model for the many 
conscious elite-led attempts at state- and nation-building in Central Asia.44 The space 
of the former Soviet Union is the product of two ambivalently intertwined processes – 
the collapse of the Soviet Union and the reconfiguration of those imperial relations 
that were preserved (albeit radically reinterpreted) in the Soviet multinational state. 
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These processes have produced associated logics of spatial ordering, one of which is 
the continuing ambivalent interplay of openness and closure of political space 
between Russia and the new states of the FSU. As Nick Megoran has shown, 
bordering practices have been widespread in post-independence Kyrgyzstan, with 
regard to neighbouring countries as well as between ethnic groups.45 However, at the 
same time, spatial ambivalences persist between Russia and Kyrgyzstan. It is well 
known that the states of the former Soviet Union habitually continue to be called the 
‘Near Abroad’ (blizhnee zarubezh'e) in Russian public political discourse.46 However, 
this does not mean that Russia has re-emerged as a Westphalian, bordered sovereign 
subject, while the ‘weak’ new states of the FSU are forced to adopt a spatial logic of 
openness towards it, in the manner of the colonizer crossing the ‘smooth surface’ of a 
space wide open to be conquered.47 ‘Boundless space’ (beskrainiaia zemlia) is an old 
trope in Russian representations of state space, but it is linked as much to experiences 
of vulnerability of territory as it is to the history of a rapidly expanding land empire 
whose borders were never fixed.48 In Kyrgyzstan, 25 years after independence, a 
similar blurring of the boundary between domestic and foreign can be traced when it 
comes to representations of Russia.49 This was reflected in interviews in both 2013 
and 2016. Regardless of political stance towards Russia, Kyrgyz interviewees did not 
describe Russia as distant and foreign – as a human rights activist critical of Russian 
involvement in Kyrgyzstan put it in 2016, ‘they are still ours (nashi)’. A UN 
employee, more positively disposed towards the Kremlin, put it more bluntly: ‘you 
have to understand: they are not foreign to us’. Another interviewee, a democratic 
activist also very critical of Russian involvement, claimed that ‘we are just a Russian 
province (guberniia)’.50!This chimes with observations that ‘cultural closeness’ is a 
persistent factor in Russian influence in Kyrgyzstan.51 A Kyrgyz political expert in 
2013 blamed this closeness for what he saw as the problematic pervasive influence of 
Russia: ‘Our population is very pro-Russian – if you ask people, they say ‘yes, they 
are our brothers, sure’. If the attitudes were different, our politicians would be able to 
‘play games’ with Russia.’52  
All of this matters for understanding Russian power in Kyrgyzstan. The openness of 
imagined space between Russia and Kyrgyzstan is not just an additional factor of ‘soft 
power’. It fundamentally constitutes both the persistence and the limitations of 
Russian influence in Kyrgyzstan. Whether the relationship between Russia and 
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Kyrgyzstan is read as predominantly post-Soviet or post-imperial/post-colonial, it is 
clear that at its core is a vast disparity of power that is expressed not only materially 
but also in cultural production. However, this disparity does not translate into all-
pervasive Russian control. Instead, Russian power is best understood as dependent on, 
and productive of, dispositions and political subjectivities constituted in the 
relationship itself.53 The ‘state effect’ contains an account of power as the effect of 
performances. In a similar vein, John Allen has proposed a conception of power at a 
distance. This is power understood as a series of ‘relational effects’, constituted in 
social interaction and always mediated in space and time; as he put it, power ‘is not 
some thing or attribute; it cannot be possessed as resources can; and it does not 
travel’.54 Resources, be they material or normative, matter for the exercise of power – 
but power is only present in concrete, situated relations.55 Thinking about power in 
this way is an ontological move away from an understanding of power as inherent in 
separate entities to a processual understanding in which power is relationally 
produced and only ever appears in its production.  
This means that power is not control by one (collective) actor over another, as the 
‘sphere of influence’ narrative suggests. Instead, it is constitutive of and dependent on 
political subjectivities on both sides. As Allen argues, this is particularly the case for 
the relational effect of power as ‘seduction’, a prevalent form of power at a distance, 
and as I will suggest below, a concept that captures Russian power in Kyrgyzstan. 
Seduction relies on suggestion and works on ‘attitudes and values that are already 
present, leaving open the possibility of rejection or indifference…[this] gives it 
considerable reach, yet at the same time curbs its intensity’.56 This reading of power 
at a distance formulates space as ‘an emergent product of relations’, ‘forever 
incomplete and in production’, as Doreen Massey has put it.57 By foregrounding the 
issue of distance, it also problematizes space, and interpretations of space, as a central 
element in the production of power. As will be seen below, Kyrgyz understandings of 
the openness of state space between Russia and Kyrgyzstan are grounded both in 
material practices and in discourse, in particular representations of state-ness and 
associated norms circulating between the two countries. Russian seductive power thus 
revolves around a regionally shared myth of the state that itself contains an account of 
openness of space – but its reach and intensity relies on seduction and is not captured 
by a narrative of ‘sphere of influence’.  
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Russia and Kyrgyzstan: performing the state effect, producing seductive power 
Russian influence in Kyrgyzstan has been associated with the rent-seeking of local 
elites.58 Since Russia’s re-engagement in the region in the early 2000s, there has been 
a steady flow of Russian loans, investment promises and debt relief, not least in 
attempts to persuade Kyrgyz elites to close down the US airbase in Manas and in the 
run-up to Kyrgyzstan’s accession to the EEU.59 Russian financial promises are no 
match for the ever-increasing volume of Chinese investments in the country, 
especially as they are all too frequently downsized or abandoned. 60  Nevertheless, 
they are one form of revenue and hence seduction for Kyrgyz elites, all the more so 
after the substantial rent paid by the US for leasing the Manas airbase ended in 2014. 
Elites also profit from their Russian connections in the way in which post-Soviet 
business networks between Russia and Kyrgyzstan and global offshore havens 
combine to produce and maintain a de-territorialized ‘offshore state’.61 In a well-
known example, Maxim Bakiev, the president’s son, was engaged in an profitable 
scheme involving Russian and American intermediaries, smuggling fuel from a 
Gazprom-owned Russian refinery to supply the US airbase.62 However, material 
entanglements are not just about personal profit or rent-seeking. Rather, broader 
economic interdependences, in conjunction with a shared myth of the state, reproduce 
relational space between Russia and Kyrgyzstan and in turn produce Russian 
seductive power.  
Kyrgyzstan’s accession to the EEU in 2015 has been taken as an illustration of the 
power of Russian statecraft. In this account, bribes and blackmailing drove Kyrgyz 
elites to join the organization against Kyrgyzstan’s own economic best interests.63 It is 
true that the EEU has not yet led to deeper economic integration, and there continue 
to be problems with the implementation of agreed transit rules into Kazakhstan in 
particular.64 Nevertheless, concrete economic interdependencies in trade, but above 
all migration, are widely cited by Kyrgyz experts as a valid reason for accession, even 
where they are otherwise critical of Russia’s relationship with Kyrgyzstan.65 About a 
third of Kyrgyz GDP is dependent on trade relations with Russia, and another third is 
ascribed to migrant remittances.66 About a fifth of Kyrgyzstan’s population are labour 
migrants to Russia, but much wider family networks depend on their income.67 
Tellingly, even though Kyrgyzstan is the main regional re-export hub for Chinese 
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goods, and there were legitimate fears that joining the EEU would damage this trade 
relationship, a large majority of the Kyrgyz population was consistently in favor.68 
The EEU accession has meant free movement rights for Kyrgyz migrants, making it 
easy to obtain work permits and reducing the ‘blacklisting’ of overstayers and illegal 
migrants.69 As a result, Kyrgyz migrant numbers to Russia and remittance income 
have risen significantly since 2015, while numbers from Tajikistan and Uzbekistan 
fell.70  
These issues hint at a relational construction of the ‘state effect’, consisting in a 
blurring of the boundaries of state space in the lives of the many Kyrgyz migrants 
who have acquired Russian citizenship, moving back and forth between the two 
countries and often developing family links in both.71 As this illustrates, material 
factors are not separable from cultural entanglements. These experiences, as well as 
historical memories and everyday practices, keep a sense of Russia as not-quite-
foreign alive, from the significance of WWII commemorations to Kyrgyz 
identifications with Russian sport teams.72  Many local print media are published in 
Russian, while some major Russian newspapers have Kyrgyz editions. Russian 
television channels are available in Kyrgyzstan, and the main evening news of 
Russia’s state channel are among the most trusted and widely watched news sources 
in the country. 73  All of this suggests that social norms, sense-making and 
interpretations of world events circulate between Russia and Kyrgyzstan. A Gallup 
poll conducted in 2015 found a 79% public approval rating for Russia’s actions in 
Ukraine.74 Reflecting this, interviewees in 2016 highlighted the extent to which the 
Russian version of events in Ukraine and current tensions between the US and 
Moscow is accepted as established fact even among educated elites.75  
These entanglements are significant for the production of Kyrgyz stateness itself. 
Representations of gosudarstvennost’ (state-ness) – of particular, culturally and 
historically grounded ‘myths of the state’ – circulate between Russia and Kyrgyzstan, 
and while there are differences in interpretation, languages of Kyrgyz statehood have 
Russian origins and reflect Soviet legacies. As discussed above, the post-Soviet ‘myth 
of the strong state’ means a state able to guarantee unity, stability and order both in 
Russia and Central Asia. In popular discourse in the region, the myth of the state is 
often expressed in images of the ‘strong leader’, suggesting a continued resonance of 
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pre-Westphalian, imperial understandings of sovereignty as located in an embodied 
subject.76 However, Kyrgyzstan is the one state in Central Asia not ruled by such a 
strongman. Instead, a small number of ‘statespeople’ rotate through political office.77 
Counter to regional tendencies, and indeed to active Russian pressure, a parliamentary 
system was introduced in 2010 as a safeguard against the corruption and clientelism 
of the Bakiev regime – though the informal politics of the country continue to place 
the president at the core of political power.78 Instability and fragile legitimacy is a 
recurrent feature of Kyrgyz politics, exemplified in the violent overthrow of the first 
president Askar Akaev in the 2005 ‘Tulip revolution’ and that of his successor (and 
beneficiary of the Tulip revolution) Bakiev in 2010. The latter event led to unrest and 
eventually violent conflict between Kyrgyz and Uzbek in the ethnically diverse 
Ferghana valley, especially in Bakiev’s stronghold in the southern city of Osh. 
Among Kyrgyz commentators, this is described as a lack or absence of Kyrgyz 
gosudarstvennost’, a lack of state-ness visible in the way that the state fails to 
maintain unity, stability and interethnic harmony.79 One aspect of this was the 
exclusion of Uzbeks from governance structures, not just at the level of political 
representation in parliament – roles in the local police for example were almost 
exclusively Kyrgyz and police actions contributed to the ethnic clashes in Osh.80 
 
This narrative of fragile state-ness in Kyrgyzstan contains representations of territorial 
sovereignty. However, these do not simply reproduce Westphalian understandings of 
bounded territory; instead, Kyrgyz representations of state space reveal multiple, 
ambivalent layers of meaning, differentiated in response to local lived experience as 
well as in relation to different outside actors. Conceptions of bounded territory 
underpin official and some popular representations of border issues with Uzbekistan 
and Tajikistan, and indeed the way the city of Osh is perceived by its inhabitants in 
the aftermath of the ethnic clashes of 2010.81 Other representations of a bounded 
Kyrgyz territory under threat from outside actors emerge in popular conspiracy 
narratives about the influx of a ‘flood’ of Chinese traders intent on settling in 
Kyrgyzstan, outnumbering its small population, or the contentious issue of a long 
lease for resorts around the region’s main tourist destination, lake Issyk-Kul, granted 
by the Bakiev government to the Kazakh government in 2009.82 There is also, 
increasingly, a discourse of Western encroachment, starting with conspiracy theories 
about Western manipulation of the Tulip revolution that were promoted by Akaev 
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himself.83 In the 2010s, this discourse has centered on the presence of the now-
defunct US airbase in Manas, Canadian ownership of the country’s richest resource, 
the Kumtor gold mine, and the extent of Western international NGO and donor 
activity in the country, in particular in the perceived ‘meddling’ of international 
agencies in the aftermath of the Osh conflict.84 Conceptions of sovereignty as freedom 
from external domination are also invoked against Russia, for example in public and 
official discourse around the EEU accession.85 However, representations of Kyrgyz 
statehood imperiled by foreign penetration of space are much less frequent with 
regard to Russia. Russia’s airbase never attracted the kind of controversy that Manas 
did; during the Osh conflict, the interim government made repeated, but unsuccessful 
requests for Russian troops to help with the conflict, while both Kyrgyz and Uzbeks 
appealed to the Russian embassy for support.86 Even as a growing Kyrgyz ethno-
nationalism has drawn on ideas of Soviet nationalities policy with its exaltation of 
ethno-territorial statehood, Russian influence is not a main target. As one interviewee 
put it, “our nationalists don’t have a conception of gosudarstvennost’ (state-ness) that 
is their own, it is all borrowed [from Russia and the USSR].”87  
In fact, the role of Russia in Kyrgyz narratives of fragile statehood is much more 
ambivalent than the simple assertion of Westphalian sovereignty against an outside 
intruder. In different ways, the performance of Kyrgyz state-ness is dependent on 
entanglements with Russia, rather than constituted in opposition to it. In spite of the 
Kremlin’s refusal to engage troops in the Osh conflict, military connections are one 
such area, and not just because Kyrgyzstan regularly participates in joint military 
exercises in the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). 
Kyrgyzstan’s joining of the EEU means that contentious borders with Uzbekistan will 
be reinforced with aid from Russia, including equipment for border guards – the 
material inscription of territorial conceptions of sovereignty, achieved as part of an 
institutionalized openness of space between Russia and Kyrgyzstan.88 This material 
support for border forces is part of a wider supply of military hardware and army 
equipment provided by Russia, equipment that Kyrgyzstan would not have the 
resources to maintain but that has symbolic value for the Kyrgyz ‘myth of the state’. 
This military support also reproduces networks between the Russian and Kyrgyz 
armies and security services, as officers are sent to be trained in Moscow.89  
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This is complemented by other practices perpetuating an ambivalent openness 
towards Russia in the performance of Kyrgyz state-ness. One example is the practice 
of ‘borrowing’ Russian laws. Kyrgyz laws across a variety of fields are often directly 
copied from relevant Russian legislation.90 This drew international attention when 
controversial Russian ‘foreign agent’ and ‘LBGT’ (lesbian, gay, bisexual, and 
transgender) laws made an appearance in Kyrgyzstan’s parliament, something that has 
been taken by outside observers as evidence of Russian pressure.91 The former 
proposed to increase restrictions on NGOs receiving financing from abroad, while the 
latter banned ‘LBTG propaganda’. As several of my interlocutors pointed out, the 
practice of copying laws is very common, a mixture of a lack of sufficiently well-
trained civil servants, and the fact that these laws correspond to local norms and 
perceptions.92 At the same time, these ‘travelling laws’ perpetuate a convergence of 
legal norms and identifications that further underscores Russia’s seductive ‘power at a 
distance’ in Kyrgyzstan. 
In this vein, it is notable that popular conspiracy theories about the extent of Russian 
power in the country abound, but often have positive connotations.93 This is visible 
not least in the popular conspiracy theory that had Russia orchestrate the overthrow of 
Bakiev, who was wildly unpopular in Bishkek and the north of the country by the 
time of his fall.94 A widespread rumor circulated in the aftermath of the Osh conflict 
in 2010, claiming that Putin was training a new Kyrgyz president who would be 
parachuted in from Moscow to strengthen Kyrgyz state-ness.95 This resonates with a 
common trope in popular discourse, the interpellation of Putin. At times of political 
instability, or simply when the Kyrgyz state is experienced as ineffective, statements 
such as ‘if only Putin was here/our president, these issues would be solved’ are 
frequent.96 These interpellations and conspiracy theories are not just anecdotal; in 
conjunction with the narrative of fragile statehood in Kyrgyzstan, they tell us 
something about conceptions of state-ness and the legitimation of power. 
Kyrgyzstan’s state elites face an ongoing legitimation crisis, which is underpinned by 
their frequent inability to perform the ‘myth of the state’. As the appeal to Putin 
shows, this is expressed in popular discourse as the failure to produce a strong leader, 
the embodied sovereign subject.97  
All this is reflected in how these imaginations of ‘Russia’ are implicated in the ways 
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that Kyrgyz statespeople aim to secure their own legitimacy and that of the state they 
claim to speak for. There is a widespread attempt by Kyrgyz statespeople to publicly 
perform embodied sovereignty by association with Russian political figures, the 
closer to Putin the better. In many cases, Kyrgyz political elites enjoy close personal 
connections with the Kremlin, often reaching back to shared Soviet experiences. 
While this matters in terms of informal channels of communication, there is a public, 
performative element to these relationships. Atambaev’s alleged personal friendship 
with Putin was widely displayed in Kyrgyz media.98 While the president is the only 
Kyrgyz politician to directly associate with Putin, Kyrgyz politicians of an array of 
parties frequently travel to Moscow and show themselves with members of Putin’s 
circle.99 This activity spikes before elections; in the past, photographs of Kyrgyz 
politicians with Kremlin insiders were shown on billboards in election campaigns, 
until this was outlawed in 2011, amid a controversy that this gave too much of an 
advantage to a particular, very pro-Russian politician.100 Another example of this 
production of sovereignty by association is Kyrgyz membership in regional 
institutions, including the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization (SCO), the CSTO – and, not least, the EEU. This includes 
Kyrgyz performance of sovereignty by participating in joint military CSTO exercises; 
likewise, Kyrgyz political elites participate in the regional phenomenon of ‘summit 
travelling’, the proliferation of summits of these institutions, where more often than 
not little concrete is achieved. However, these summits provide a useful platform for 
the display of both personal associations and the trappings of sovereign statehood.101  
These practices secure legitimate power through association with ‘Russia’ rather than 
differentiation from it, in direct contravention to a Westphalian logic of sovereignty. 
In other words, performing association produces, rather than weakens, the ‘state 
effect’. This can be read as a version of the ‘sovereign excess’ that has been identified 
by James D. Sidaway as characteristic for the post-colonial African state.102 As 
Sidaway has pointed out, the globally networked African state is secured by ‘how [its] 
sovereignty is rendered intelligible and represented’, achieved precisely in 
international exchange and association in regional communities – a relationally 
established ‘sovereign excess’ rather than the delimitation of sovereignty suggested 
by the Westphalian geopolitical imagination.103 While the Kyrgyz myth of the state is 
situated in a somewhat different post-colonial/post-Soviet context, the above indicates 
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a similar logic of state-ness produced not in imitation of a European model of 
statehood but in the performance of different localized meanings of sovereignty, 
including those reproduced in relations and associations.  
Reach and limitations of Russian seductive power  
Thus, imaginations of and entanglements with ‘Russia’ are implicated at the same 
time in the production of the Kyrgyz ‘state effect’ and Russian seductive power. What 
happens when associations are publicly withdrawn, is shown by the most spectacular 
example of the reach of Russian seductive power in Kyrgyzstan, the role played by 
the Kremlin in bringing down Bakiev’s presidency in 2010. Whether or not this was 
done to get the US out of Manas, or whether the aim even was to overthrow Bakiev, 
remains an open question.104 However, the incident illustrates the operation of 
Russian ‘power at a distance’. By late 2009, public dissatisfaction with a visibly 
corrupt regime was high.105 In this context, Russian media started to report negatively 
on the corrupt business dealings of the Bakiev family, signalling the Kremlin’s 
dissatisfaction to a receptive Kyrgyz audience. The raising of fuel duties in April 
2010 added a material incentive to the mix, but the uprising would not have happened 
had there not been deep-seated dissatisfaction with Bakiev among a large part of the 
population, and among those political elites not party to his corruption networks.106 
This last point reflects the pervasiveness, but also the limitations of Russian seductive 
power. There is no causal chain to be uncovered, and perhaps no strategic aim, in the 
diffuse production of power that helped de-legitimize Bakiev. It emerged relationally, 
through the complicity of those willingly responding to the seduction. In this, Soviet 
legacies, representations of openness of space and a shared ‘myth of the state’ cannot 
be separated from material entanglements in entrenching Russia’s seductive power in 
Kyrgyzstan. 
This example shows the reach of seductive power, but its strength should not be 
overstated. Seductive power can easily be resisted and subverted, and Kyrgyz political 
elites have done so on numerous occasions. This has been read as the consequence of 
the presence of other outside actors, the US and EU, Turkey, and increasingly China, 
as alternative sources of material benefits.107 But it should be noted that such 
subversion has continued in recent years, when the US in particular was disengaging 
from the country and Western aid was drying up, while the increasing economic 
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dependence on China stoked fears of Chinese encroachment.108 Bakiev, for once, 
resisted Russian pressure to close the Manas airbase, preferring to use Russian threats 
to extract higher rents from the US.109 When the new parliamentary constitution was 
introduced in 2010, this was against the express, and publicly articulated, wishes of 
the Kremlin.110 The foreign agent law and the LBGT laws, both widely cited as 
evidence of considerable Russian influence in Kyrgyzstan, were eventually defeated 
in parliament, after extensive lobbying by civil society actors and NGOs.111 Atambaev 
himself was not simply a ‘pro-Russian’ president, not least because of his exaltation 
of the 2010 events as ‘revolution’ and obvious identification with the colour 
revolutions that the Kremlin has so vehemently opposed.112 And while the networked 
openness of political space between Russia and Kyrgyzstan helps to produce Kyrgyz 
‘sovereign excess’ and Russian seductive power, conceptions of Westphalian 
sovereignty, of closure of such space, can be and are indeed invoked.  
 
Given the reliance of Russian seductive power on shared representations, its 
durability is also in question. While it has endured through the 1990s, a period when 
Russia was largely disengaged from the region, it is less clear whether it will stretch 
into the future. It is unclear what would happen if an anti-Russian narrative emerged 
as a rallying point for Kyrgyz nationalist mobilization. There are some hints of this, 
for example in recent Kyrgyz debates on how to commemorate the events of 1916, 
when an estimated 100,000 Kyrgyz died and others fled to Afghanistan and China 
opposing a forced draft into the Tsarist army.113 There is a generational divide in the 
constitution of political subjectivities, expressed also in the increasing popularity of 
post-colonial narratives among the second post-Soviet generation.114 Again, this is 
intertwined with more tangible factors: while many Kyrgyz students continue go to 
Moscow to study or work, recent years have seen more and more students choosing to 
study in Asia and the West.115 In addition to the Kyrgyz-Russian Slavonic University, 
several English-language universities as well as Turkish schools and universities are 
present in Kyrgyzstan.116 In the face of the internationalization of Kyrgyzstan’s 
educated youth, the current pervasiveness of Russian seductive power and the 
relational production of not-quite-foreignness on which it relies, may well turn out to 
be a Soviet legacy limited by the passing of time.  
 
All this indicates that Russian power in Kyrgyzstan does not conform to images of a 
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Great Game fought between Great Powers over a passive territory that may be pulled 
into one or another sphere of influence. This is not simply because local elites can 
play off different external actors against each other and force them to conform to 
‘local rules’, as Alex Cooley has argued.117 The conception of space and state that 
underpins ‘sphere of influence’ also determines a particular understanding of power: 
an intentionalist account of one discrete actor trying to exercise control over another – 
‘power over’, to use Steve Luke’s well-known typology.118 However, as has been 
seen above, insofar as Russian power is pervasive and persuasive, it is because the 
Kyrgyz – state elites and population – are actively involved in its perpetuation. A 
relationally produced myth of the state secures local legitimacy and the ‘state effect’, 
complemented by the continued circulation and reproduction of shared norms and 
understandings.  This constitutes a Russian seductive power against which US ‘soft 
power’ and ‘norm diffusion’ strategies over the years, much more elaborate and much 
better resourced, have proven relatively ineffective.119  
This may not be a specific failure of American soft power strategies, but a broader 
issue regarding the effectiveness of statecraft as a central element of an intentionalist 
account of power, especially as the region is seeing a rising groundswell of anti-
Americanism.120 Likewise, targeted Russian statecraft in Kyrgyzstan appears to have 
limited effect; the Kremlin cannot control Kyrgyz imaginations of Russia. Russian 
‘active measures’ were heavily increased after the 2010 toppling of Bakiev, including 
the launch of a dedicated Kyrgyz branch of the Russian propaganda channel Sputnik 
in 2014. Nevertheless, they are generally judged by local interlocutors to be 
ineffective.121 The execution of these soft power strategies is often lacklustre, be they 
the local branch of Rossotrudnichestvo (a Russian state agency dedicated to 
‘humanitarian cooperation and the support of Russian compatriots abroad’), the 
financing of pro-Russian NGOs, academic conferences, targeted media outlets or the 
(widely rumoured) bribing of MPs before elections. David Lewis cites one Kyrgyz 
commentator who bluntly stated that in elections ‘those who get that money will use it 
somehow, and then they will quite simply dump Russia’.122 Attempts to intervene in 
the public debate are often heavy-handed; at one Russian-organized academic 
conference attempting to give a positive spin to the events of 1916, the Kyrgyz 
participants walked out in the face of what they perceived to be a propaganda 
event.123 It is noticeable that the negative reporting on Maxim Bakiev in Russian 
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media in 2009 that helped set the stage for the toppling of his father in 2010 came 
from news sources not specifically targeting Kyrgyzstan (Russia’s Channel 1 main 
evening news and major Russian newspapers), with reports that were factually 
correct.124 
Geopolitical imaginations, the EEU and the Russian myth of the state 
This leaves the question whether the EEU which Kyrgyzstan joined in 2015 is the 
institutionalization of a Sphere of Influence, a ‘geopolitical project’ which necessarily 
subjects Kyrgyzstan to an exclusionary spatial logic. 125  After all, geopolitical 
narratives resonate in Russia as much as in the West, not least with the rise to 
prominence of Eurasianist ideologies, and the move of concepts such as ‘civilizational 
geopolitics’ from the fringes to the center of official discourse.126 The concept of a 
‘Russian World’ (Russkii Mir) has acquired new prominence and has been used to 
justify Russia’s interference in Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea in 2014.127 
Putin has stated that the EEU draws on pre-existing ties reaching back to the Soviet 
Union.128 At the same time, the Kremlin is clearly seeking a hegemonic position in 
the post-Soviet space, expressed in official discourse as ‘sphere of privileged 
interests’ (sfera privilegirovannogo interesa) – a neologism without the strong spatial 
or normative associations of ‘sphere of influence’, a term that continues to be avoided 
in anything but a negative sense.129 The upsurge in Russian statecraft, and the 
Kremlin’s use of military force in meddling in ‘frozen conflicts’ are ample evidence 
of this attempt to gain influence. However, it has been noted that in official discourse 
these geopolitical concepts, be it Russkii Mir or the growing importance of 
civilizational discourse are diffuse, ambivalent, a ‘fuzzy mental atlas’, rather than the 
exclusionary territorial control evoked by ‘sphere of influence’.130  
Moving away from explicitly geopolitical language, post-Soviet Russian 
representations of Great Power status do not easily map on the spatial imagery of the 
modern geopolitical imagination – in line both with the historical resonance of 
understandings of (velikaia) derzhava (Great Power) and with a global evolution in 
the meaning of the concept since the end of the Cold War. Representations and 
performances of derzhavnost’ (Great Power-ness) are a central element in Russia’s 
myth of the state.131 Its oldest and core meaning, widely reproduced in public political 
discourse, implies samostaiatelnost’, sovereignty not primarily as spatial construct, 
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but as independence of action, currently associated with the ability to act as a ‘pole’ in 
an emerging multipolar world order.132 This focus on derzhava as independent actor-
ness, including the use of military force, is by no means limited to Russia, but has 
been very visible in recent Russian actions. Sovereign independence of action is being 
publicly performed in spectacular acts, from Georgia, to Crimea, to Syria. However, 
these performances should not obscure that since the end of the Cold War there has 
been an evolution in the meaning of ‘Great Power’ in which Russia also participates, 
and which arguably underpins the geopolitical project of the EEU. While control over 
space defined Great Power status during high imperialism and the Cold War, this is 
historically contingent and already in the process of evolving. John Agnew has 
pointed out how conceptions of primacy started to shift to the economic realm before 
the end of the Cold War; the economic meta-narrative of globalization has accelerated 
this trend.133 The myth of the state has proven to be more resilient than suggested by 
the globalization literature, but the networked nature of the liberal world economy and 
a perceived need to maintain openness to achieve economic growth is already 
transforming the spatial assumptions associated with the concept of Great Power. 
The ‘rising powers’ discourse, with its central focus on economic potential, has its 
origins in an acronym (BRICs: Brazil, Russia, India, China) originally coined by a 
Goldman Sachs report on investment opportunities in emerging economies.134 The 
Kremlin has sponsored an international economic organization of the same name 
(adding South Africa), which brings together these non-Western ‘rising powers’. In 
recent years, BRICS has grown from a vague agenda of ‘summit travelling’ into a 
network of fledgling financial institutions and mechanisms, including a BRICS 
development bank, a contingent reserve agreement and an alternative BRICS 
payments system.135 Given this new focus on economic success as a key to Great 
Power status, and Russia’s somewhat precarious status as a ‘rising economy’, it is 
entirely plausible that the EEU has economic aims rather than representing a hidden 
agenda to create a sphere of influence.136 Originally, the EEU was presented as an 
integrative project that was aimed at closer association with the EU, China and 
regional economic organizations in Asia, in the hope of giving Russia a stronger 
negotiating position as the center of its own regional economic bloc. In Putin’s 2011 
article launching the idea, the EEU project was explicitly modeled on EU integration, 
with a geopolitical imagery that alluded to global openness, not exclusionary closure.  
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It aimed at developing subsequent links with the EU; as he claimed, ‘entry into the 
Eurasian Union allows each of its participants more quickly and from stronger 
positions to integrate into Europe’, aiming for a common economic space ‘from 
Lisbon to Vladivostok’.137 The EEU is a spatial and hence geopolitical project, but 
this does not automatically make it an attempt to recreate the FSU as an exclusive 
sphere of influence. Instead, it can be read as underpinning Russia’s attempt at 
transformation into a contemporary Great Power, holding its own in a world 
increasingly dominated by regional economic blocs and trade agreements.  
The economic viability of the EEU project always hinged on Ukraine’s membership, 
which then Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovich was reluctant to agree to, 
especially as he was negotiating a EU association agreement at the same time.138  
Subsequent events are familiar – the Kremlin’s attempts to bribe him into joining the 
EEU, leading to mass protests in Kiev and the overthrow of Yanukovich in early 
2014, followed by Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the triggering of new 
geopolitical faultlines with the West far beyond Ukraine. However, in spite of the 
Kremlin’s increasingly outspoken rejection of liberal values since the Ukraine 
conflict, the presentation of the EEU in terms of (neo)liberal tropes and narratives of 
an economic space networked into the global economy has continued.139 This reflects 
a tradition of contradictory ambivalence in official discourse under Putin, that persists 
even as the official ‘conservative project’ is broadcast ever more vociferously. 
Without Ukraine, the EEU may well join a list of failed regional economic integration 
projects in Central Asia and the FSU; Kyrgyzstan’s troubles with Kazakhstan over 
EEU customs regulations in 2017, leading to long queues at the border, certainly do 
not point to the frictionless economic integration the project promised.140 Diverging 
economic needs as well as the fallout from Russia’s conflict with the West have 
caused tensions, and plans for a supranational element mirroring the European 
Commission are currently suspended.141 In the meantime, however, ‘over 40’ planned 
free trade agreements with the Asia-Pacific region, China and Israel are heavily 
promoted by the Kremlin and future integration with the EU continues to be 
referenced.142 And while the Kremlin has in the past resisted Chinese proposals for a 
China-dominated SCO free trade area and development bank, there are also first hints 
that the EEU could be used as vehicle for integration into such an area.143  
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None of the above should be taken to mean that exclusionary spatial logics are not 
another, currently very visible, part of the Russian myth of the state. This is 
performed both in the Kremlin’s discourse exalting territorial sovereignty in 
accordance with the UN Charta, and in its current confrontation with the West in 
increasingly shrill exhortations of a new Cold War. These issues are intertwined; they 
highlight the operation of differentiated spatial logics, rather than a single quest for 
spheres of influence, in Russia’s own myth of the state and its performance in 
relations with the post-Soviet space. Logics of exclusion/self-exclusion in the 
geopolitical production of ‘Russia’ in relation to ‘the West’ (though not a much more 
ambivalent imagined space of ‘Europe’) are prominent.144  This is reflected not least 
in the use of military force in Ukraine and Georgia, itself a stark illustration of the 
limits of Russia’s seductive power. Ever since the colour revolutions in Georgia and 
particularly Ukraine in 2003/4, such logics of self-exclusion combine with 
representations of the openness and vulnerability of state space in narratives of 
Western encroachment in the post-Soviet space. In reaction to the 2004 Orange 
revolution, and especially since the 2014 events in Ukraine, such representations are 
increasingly taking the form of conspiracy theories narrating a pervasive, covert 
Western statecraft aimed not only at the establishment of an institutionalized, 
exclusionary Western sphere of influence in the post-Soviet space, but also a direct 
Western threat to Putin’s hold on power and the very existence of the Russian state.145  
Events in Kyrgyzstan have never triggered these kinds of exclusionary narratives and 
performances, not even in the ‘game’ around the Manas airbase, and certainly not in 
the ‘Tulip revolution’ of 2005, where the ‘revolutionaries’ travelled to Moscow 
shortly before the event.146 Russian reactions to the presence of the US in Central 
Asia were much more ambivalent – and in relation to Afghanistan, often cooperative. 
When the Kremlin was asked by the Kyrgyz interim government to become militarily 
involved to help end the conflict in Osh, it declined, unwilling to become embroiled 
in the complex security situation of the Ferghana valley; here too, there was a degree 
of cooperation with the US over the issue.147 China’s increased economic engagement 
in the region, not just Kyrgyzstan, is narrated and performed by the Kremlin in terms 
of cooperation and interdependence. 148  Contrary to the generalized logics of 
exclusionary space associated with ‘Sphere of Influence’, Russian interactions with 
the post-Soviet space and beyond need to be understood in terms of multiple, 
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intersecting spatial logics specific to particular relationships.  
Conclusion  
As the above has shown, the imaginations of space and state at play between Russia 
and Kyrgyzstan are much more differentiated and ambiguous than a rigid account of 
spheres of influence as exclusionary spaces suggests. The understanding of power as 
exclusive control over territory established through strategies of ‘statecraft’ suggested 
by this ontology do not capture either the reach or the limitations of Russian power in 
Kyrgyzstan. Instead, Russian power should be understood as seductive: pervasive but 
weak – and only ever present in concrete, situated relationships. Through exchange 
and association, and not least a mutually resonant ‘myth of the state’, it is implicated 
in producing the Kyrgyz ‘state effect’ and sometimes may be implicated in de-
stabilizing it. Nevertheless, it would be wrong to infer a generalized weakening of 
sovereignty from Kyrgyz associations with Russia – on the contrary, these 
associations help produce ‘sovereign excess’ and thus secure the Kyrgyz state effect.  
Russian entanglements with Kyrgyzstan also contribute to producing the Russian 
‘state effect’, with its own ambivalent spatial logics. Russia’s Great Power myth, like 
all post-Soviet myths of the state, is complex, combining specific historical legacies 
with evolving global meanings of Great Power status. The linear account of power as 
control over territory associated with spheres of influence is not at the core of the 
meaning of derzhava (Great Power) as sovereign independence of action currently 
reproduced in official Russian discourse or performances. And in the Russian myth of 
the state, spatial logics of (self-) exclusion co-exist with representations of openness 
of space. Closures of space tend to be triggered in particular interactions, often with 
an imagined space of the West – and even here, as Russian engagements with the US 
after the Osh conflict show, such exclusionary logics are part of particular contexts 
rather than a generalized phenomenon. They are not inevitably associated with a 
Russian Great Power myth. 
It might be contended that we have simply been defining 21st century spheres of 
influence wrong – that in our globalized age, the return of spheres of influence must 
mean de-territorialized, spatially open relation-making. Obviously, the Westphalian 
imagination underpinning the concept does not capture the way the myth of the state 
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is reproduced (and productive) in a post-Westphalian world. But this suggestion 
overlooks the fact that the meaning of concepts – in particular of heavily politicized 
concepts such as sphere of influence – is not under the control of any one speaker and 
cannot simply be redefined at will. 149 Given the current state of relations between 
Russia and the West, the concept of sphere of influence remains politically active, 
normatively loaded and quite specific in the geopolitical imagination it conveys. In 
Western commentary, it is associated with the image of Russia as a ‘19th century 
power in a 21st century world’, the idea that Russia is reduced to seeking confirmation 
of Great Power status in a quest for spheres of influence precisely because it cannot 
adapt to an open, liberal world order defined by a very different geopolitical 
imagination.150 Thinking in terms of spheres of influence obscures the way that 
Russian seductive power in Kyrgyzstan reflects the intersection of global ‘post-
Westphalian’ trends, such as the scale of migration to Russia and the globally 
networked ‘offshore state’, with multiple Soviet and imperial legacies. It also 
essentializes a connection between a Russian ‘Great Power identity’ and a quest for 
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